These Papers are Using PrefLib
Below is a list of papers that have made use of or directly referenced data stored here at PrefLib. The papers have been automatically added from Google Scholar, if there is a problem with a paper or if you want to add one paper, please contact us.
- Heuristics in Multi-Winner Approval Voting. J Scheuerman, JL Harman, N Mattei et al., arXiv preprint (2019).
- High-multiplicity election problems. Z Fitzsimmons, E Hemaspaandra, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (2019).
- House markets and single-peaked preferences: From centralized to decentralized allocation procedures. A Beynier, N Maudet, S Rey, P Shams, arXiv preprint (2019).
- How hard is the manipulative design of scoring systems?. D Baumeister, T Hogrebe, Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2019).
- How Similar Are Two Elections?. P Faliszewski, P Skowron, A Slinko, S Szufa et al., Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2019).
- k-Majority Digraphs and the Hardness of Voting with a Constant Number of Voters. G Bachmeier, F Brandt, C Geist, P Harrenstein et al., Journal of Computer and System Sciences (2019).
- Learning plackett-luce mixtures from partial preferences. A Liu, Z Zhao, C Liao, P Lu, L Xia, Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2019).
- Lie on the Fly: Strategic Voting in an Iterative Preference Elicitation Process. L Dery, S Obraztsova, Z Rabinovich et al., Group Decision and Negociation (2019).
- Median constrained bucket order rank aggregation. A D'Ambrosio, C Iorio, M Staiano, R Siciliano, Computational Statistics (2019).
- Modeling People's Voting Behavior with Poll Information. R Fairstein, A Lauz, R Meir, K Gal, Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (2019).
- Multi-agent soft constraint aggregation via sequential voting: theoretical and experimental results. C Cornelio, MS Pini, F Rossi, KB Venable, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (2019).
- Normative uncertainty and social choice. C Tarsney, Mind (2019).
- Optimizing positional scoring rules for rank aggregation. I Caragiannis, X Chatzigeorgiou, GA Krimpas et al., Artificial Intelligence (2019).
- Practical Algorithms for Multi-Stage Voting Rules with Parallel Universes Tiebreaking. J Wang, S Sikdar, T Shepherd, Z Zhao et al., Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (2019).
- Single transferable vote: Incomplete knowledge and communication issues. M Ayadi, N Ben Amor, J Lang, D Peters, Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (2019).
Even more references, papers, and tutorials can be found in the proceedings of the EXPLORE Workshops:
Some Tools to Work with Preferences
Empirical experiments with real data are becoming a more fundamental part of work in computational social choice. In addition to a lightweight set of tools for working with data from PrefLib we also host documentation for several of these project. Please contact Nick if you have code that you would like to share with the community.
This is a voting simulator built for the paper A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria. We are releasing its source code to be expanded and enhanced by the community. However, it is quite versatile in its current construction, and can be used for various simulations "as is".
Learn more.
Kidney failure is a life-threatening health issue that affects hundreds of thousands of people worldwide. In the US alone, the waitlist for a kidney transplant has over 100,000 patients. This list is growing: demand far outstrips supply.This codebase includes: structural elements of kidney exchange like "pools", "hospitals", and "pairs", a couple of kidney exchange graph generators, a couple of kidney exchange solvers (max weight, failure-aware, fairness-aware, individually rational), and a dynamic kidney exchange simulator.
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CRISNER stands for Conditional and Relative Importance Statement Network PrEference Reasoner. It can reason about ceteris paribus preference languages such as CP-nets, TCP-nets and CP-theories. Given a preference specification (a set of preference statements) in one of these languages, CRISNER succinctly encodes its induced preference graph (IPG) into a Kripke structure model in the language of the NuSMV model checker. This Kripke model is reachability-equivalent to the induced preference graph. CRISNER generates the model only once, and then translates each query posed against this preference specification into a temporal logic formula in computation-tree temporal logic (CTL) such that the formula is verified in the Kripke model if and only if the query holds true according to the ceteris paribus semantics of the preference language. The model checker either affirms the query or returns with a counterexample. For answering queries related to equivalence and subsumption checking of two sets of preferences, CRISNER constructs a combined IPG and uses temporal queries in CTL to identify whether every dominance that holds in one also holds in the other, and vice-versa.
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